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Abstract 
Calibration concerns the relationship between subjective 
probabilities and the long-run frequencies of events. Theorems from 
the statistical and probability literature are reviewed to discover 
the conditions under which a coherent Bayesian expects to be calibrated. 
If the probability assessor knows the outcomes of all previous events 
when making each assessment, calibration is always expected. However, 
when such outcome feedback is lacking, the assessor expects to be 
well calibrated on an exchangeable set of events if and only if 
all the events in question are viewed as independent. Although this 
strong condition has not been tested in previous research, we speculate 
that the past findings of pervasive overconfidence are not invalid. 
Although experimental studies of calibration hold promise for the 
development of cognitive theories of confidence, their value for the 
practice of probability assessment seems more limited. Efforts to train 
probability assessors to be calibrated may be misplaced. 
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A Subjectivist View of Calibration 
The need for subjectively assessed probabilities has become widely 
recognized in the last ten years. Such probabilities are routinely 
used by weather forecasters (Murphy, in press) and are gaining adherents 
in medicine (Lusted, 1968), business (Brown, Kahr & Peterson, 1974), 
intelligence analysis (Cambridge & Shreckengost, Note 1), and 
technological risk assessment (even the "Rasmussen Report", USNRC, 
1975, used subjectively assessed probabilities to quantify failure 
rates). 
Accompanying this interest has been a burgeoning experimental 
literature exploring the validity of such assessments. This validity 
has usually been sought in a characteristic called calibration (also 
sometimes called reliability, Murphy, 1973). For probabilities assigned 
to the outcomes of discrete events (e.g., will it rain tomorrow?), 
probability assessments are calibrated, or well calibrated, if, in the 
1.on~run, the proportion of true events is equal to the probability 
assigned to the events. Thus just 70% of all events to which one assigned 
a probability of .7 should be true. For probability density functions 
assessed over the range of an uncertain continuous quantity (e.g., how 
many inches of rain will fall tomorrow?), the assessments are well 
calibrated if, in the long run, the proportion of true values that fall 
at or below the n'th fractile of the assessed probability density 
functions is equal ton. Thus, for example, just 50% of the true values should 
fall at or below the .50 fractile, or median, of the assessed distributions. 
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For a review of the research literature on calibration see Lichtenstein, 
Fischhoff, and Phillips (1982). 
The research on calibration seems to have been motivated both by a 
concern for its practical implications and by an interest in the 
cognitive processes involved in thinking under uncertainty. Practically 
speaking, people want other people to be well calibrated. If you are a 
surgeon recommending that your patient undergo an operation, the patient 
can more easily evaluate your advice when your statement, "There is only 
X% chance of serious complications" can be interpreted as a statement 
consistent with your previous surgical outcomes. A drug company can more 
effectively plan for the future when the predictions its staff makes 
about possible new drugs are well-calibrated probabilities (Balthasar, 
Boschi, & Menke, 1978). 
For the cognitive psychologist, measures of calibration provide a 
tool for investigating the conditions that affect our feelings of 
uncertainty and the processes underlying these feelings. The research 
has been directed towards such questions as: Are people overconfident? 
When? Why? 
The subjectivist, or Bayesian, view of probability (de Finetti, 
1974; Savage, 1954) rejects the idea that relative frequencies provide 
the definitional foundation for probabilities. But subjectivists have 
seemed to regard calibration, which is frequency-based, as somehow a 
good thing. Raiffa, for example, has written: 
As consumers, we should like probabilistic reports to be 
externally validated by empirical frequencies. We should want 
our experts to calibrate themselves in such a way that if we 
were to group together a large number of forecasts in the 
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.8 probability category (say), then roughly .8 of the forecasts 
should turn out to be correct (Note 2, p. 5). 
Roberts made a similarly intuitive appeal: 
Even among people who are enthusiastic about expressing 
numerical probability assessments, there is a feeling that 
these assessments will have been in vain unless they are borne 
out by subsequent frequencies (Note 3, p. 5). 
More recently, subjectivists have been no more specific about the 
theoretical foundations of calibration: 
To most people, it seems reasonable to say that events 
which are assigned a subjective probability of 30% should, 
on the average, occur 30% of the time (Harrison, 1977, p. 322). 
The present paper attempts to fill this gap in subjectivist theory 
by exploring the conditions under which a person (called you) who 
subscribes to the subjectivist theory of probability would expect to 
be well calibrated and under what conditions you would expect not to 
be well calibrated. 
We begin by setting the stage with some general considerations. 
We then discuss separately two situations that turn out to be critical 
for calibration. In the first situation we assume that each time 
you make a probability assessment,. you know the outcomes of all the events 
for which you ha& previously assessed probabilities. Two theorems 
are presented for this outcome-feedback situation, one for probability 
density functions assessed for uncertain continuous quantities and the 
other for probabilities of discrete events. The results of these 
theorems are very general: you will always expect to be well calibrated. 
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In the second situation, outcome feedback is lacking. That is, 
you must make a large number of probability assessments before learning 
the outcome of any one of the events being assessed. Here the results 
are very different: you will expect to be well calibrated only under 
strong (and thus perhaps rarely met) assumptions. 
Along the way, we will try to explicate the implications of these 
theorems for psychological research on calibration and for the practice 
of probability assessment. 
General Considerations 
Subjectivism and coherence. We assume, throughout this paper, the 
subjectivist view of probabilities, under which probabilities are 
coherent degrees of belief, beliefs you would be willing to bet on. 
Coherence is the key concept in the subjectivist theory; indeed, the 
usual axioms of probability (i.e., probabilities are numbers from Oto 
1 such that the probability of a union of two mutually exclusive events 
is the sum of the probabilities of the events and the probabilities 
of mutually exclusive and exhaustive events sum to one) can be derived 
from the single idea of coherence (de Finetti, 1980; Kemeny, 1955; 
Kyberg, & Smokler, 1980; Lehman, 1955; Ramsey, 1980; Savage, 1954; 
Shimony, 1955). Coherence is defined in terms of betting, specifically, 
in terms of a Dutch book. A set of probabilities are coherent if no 
Dutch book can be made from them. A Dutch book is a set of two or more 
bets placed on the outcomes of one or more uncertain events such that 
the person holding the bets will surely lose money, regardless of the 
outcome(s) of the event(s). 
As an example of incoherent probabilities, suppose you believe that 
P(A) = .75 and that P(not-A) = .80. Then I can form two bets that 
individually seem fair but together constitute a Dutch book, as follows: 
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Bet 1: If A occurs, you win $1. 
If not-A occurs, you lose $3. 
Bet 2: If A occurs, you lose $4. 
If not-A occurs, you win $1. 
Bet 1 is based on your first belief, that A is three times as likely 
as not-A to occur. Bet 2 is based on your second belief, that not-A 
is four times as likely to occur as A. But the two bets taken together 
guarantee that you will lose money. If A occurs, you will win $1 and 
lose $4, for a net loss of ~3. If not-A occurs, you will lose $3 and 
win $1, for a net loss of $2. 
Unless otherwise specified, we assume throughout this paper that 
probabilities are coherent. In particular, all the probabilities in 
the theorerrs below are coherent. 
Telling the truth. We note here, in order to exclude them from 
further consideration, situations in which the payoffs (either 
monetary or otherwise) ensuing from your assessments motivate you to 
lie, that is, to report as probabilities something other than your 
true beliefs. We would not, in general, expect such probabilities to 
be well calibrated. As an extreme example, suppose you are told that 
the occurrence of any event to which you have previously assessed a 
probability of .25 or less will lead to your immediate execution by 
firing squad, yet you are required to use, at least occasionally, 
small but non-zero probabilities. Under these conditions, you would 
expect to be quite badly calibrated (you would certainly not want 
20% of your .20 assessments to occur). We thus begin by assuming that 
our search for conditions under which you expect to be well calibrated 
will be limited to those situations for which the payoffs encourage you 
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to tell the truth. Such payoff functions are called proper scoring 
rules (Stael von Holstein, 1970) or, equivalently, reproducing scoring 
systems (Shuford, Albert & Massengill, 1966). This limitation to 
proper scoring rules is not a trivial one in practice. While we know 
of no assessors who will be shot at dawn if "wrong", we suspect that 
many real uses of probabilities entail payoffs such as "being made to 
look the fool" or "increased chance of job promotion" that may not 
be proper. 
Communicating with others. We exclude from this paper any 
discussion of how you might view other people's probability assessments 
or how you should use information concerning both their probability 
assessments and their possible lack of calibration to alter your own 
beliefs. These topics are discussed by DeGroot and Fienberg (Note 4), 
Lindley (Note 5), Lindley, Tversky, and Brown (1979), and Morris (1974; 1977). 
Almost sure convergence. Finally, a technical note about the 
theorems that follow: The theorems use a particular kind of convergence 
of a sequence of random variables to a probability distribution, called 
almost sure convergence (Loeve, 1960). This is a strong sense of 
convergence, and can be thought of as meaning, "it is a virtual certainty 
to you that .••• " 
With these general matters behind us, we turn now to the theorems 
about calibration. 
Outcome Feedback 
A fundamental distinction in the theory of calibration is whether 
one knows the outcome of all previous events before one is required 
to state one's probability for the next event. If one has that 
information, we say that one has outcome feedback. 
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The following result, due to Pratt (Note 6) and reported here with 
his permission, concerns the assessment of continuous uncertain 
quantities, e., in the case of outcome feedback. 
l 
Pratt's theorem. Suppose that you are going to assess judgmentally 
the distributions for a set of parameters 81, e2 , Let S be n 
the number of 8. among 81 , •.. , 8 such that 8. falls below the p'th fractile 1 n 1 
of its assessed distribution, and assume for convenience the assessed 
distributions are all continuous. 
- -Theorem 1. Under these conditions, if you know 81, . • . , ek when 
you make your assessment of ek+l' 
(a) You must regard S as binomially distributed with parameters n . 
(b) 
n and p; 
1 
You are almost sure that - S + p. 
n n 
Pratt's proof is given in the Appendix. 
An example might help make the theorem clear. Suppose it is your 
job to predict how many people will attend a particular movie house 
each night. For each night, you assess a distribution over the then-
uncertain parameter, total number of tickets sold < e.) . 
l 
Typically, you 
express each distribution as a set of fractiles. The .25 fractile (p) 
for night i might be, say, 100, meaning "my probability that attendance 
will be equal to or less than 100 is .25." The next morning you find 
out how many tickets were in fact sold (outcome feedback) and then make 
an assessment for the coming night. Over n such nights, you count the 
number of times (S) that the actual attendance was equal to or smaller 
n 
than the attendance you associated with fractile p (did 100 or fewer 
people attend on night i?). Part (b) of Theorem 1 shows the convergence 
of the proportion S /n to the fractile p; thus it says that you are 
n 
virtually certain you are (in the long run) well calibrated. 
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The importance of Pratt's result is its generality. It places no 
conditions on what kind of events you are assessing or on what beliefs 
you hold concerning possible interrelationships among the events. It 
simply says that under conditions of outcome feedback for the assessment 
of continuous probability density functions, coherence alone implies 
calibration. 
Dawid's theorem. The case of probabilities assessed for discrete 
events has been explored by Dawid (in press), who has proven a theorem 
as general as Pratt's. 
Suppose that A1 , A2 , •.. , Aj, ••• is a set of events. 
Suppose that p1 , p2 , ..• are someone's subjective probabilities for 
A
1
, A2 ...• The assessment of pi is made only after th~ outcomes of 
A1 , ... , Ai-l are known. 
Now we wish to form a sum, like S in Pratt's Theorem, whose 
n 
convergence is to be studied. To have a hope of convergence, this sum 
must have infinitely many events in it. Thus,although it might be 
natural to form the sum by including all the events, and only those events, 
within some prespecified interval of subjective probability, we 
could not be certain, in advance, of having infinitely many events in 
the sum. For this reason, Dawid introduces the technical device of 
a probability~- that the event A. is selected for inclusion in the sum. 
1 1 
Here~- can depend on the outcomes of A. 
1
, A. 2 , .•. in an arbitrary 1 1- 1-
way, and so in particular, ~- can depend on p .• 
j 1 1 
Now we can let n. = 
J 
E ~ • , which is 
i=l 1 
roughly the number of events from the first j to be 
j 
included in the sum. Finally, let S. = E ~.Y., where Y. takes the 
J i=l 1 1 1 
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value 1 if Ai occurs and zero otherwise. Then Sj can be interpreted 
roughly as the number of the first j events that are selected and occur. 
j 
Finally let T. = I: ~.p., which is roughly the sum of the subjective 
J i=l 1 1 
probabilities for the events that are included in the sum. Then Dawid 
proves the following: 
Theorem 2. If j + 00 and the~. are chosen so that n. + 00 , then 
1 J 
S. T. 
_J_ - __J_ + 0 almost surely. 
nj nj 
This theorem says (roughly) that the difference between the 
proportion of events that occur, S./n., and the average assessed 
J J 
probabilities, T./n., goes to zero; thus, you expect with near certainty 
J J 
to be well calibrated. 
Like Pratt's Theorem, Dawid's Theorem requires no assumptions on the 
pr~bability structure of the se_t of events, A1 , _ A2 ._ •. , except feedback. We 
summarize the import of Pratt and Dawid's work by saying that coherence 
implies calibration in the presence of outcome feedback. 
How is calibration achieved? How might you accomplish the calibration 
you almost surely expect from Theorems 1 and 2? One obvious possibility 
is to keep a running tally of assessments and outcomes ("So far I've 
used .7 six times, of which three were right", etc.). Such a tally 
could be summarized in a calibration curve, which shows, for all your 
assessments, the relationship between your assessments (on the abcissa) 
and the proportion of events that occurred (on the ordinate). If the 
running tally or the calibration curve indicate poor calibration, you might 
wish to use the data to find a transformation function y(E;p), where y depends 
'lUly on p and is a continuous function of p. You intend to say y 
whenever, in the future, you believe p, and in this way be well 
calibrated. 
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If your initial beliefs, p, are coherent, however, you are 
confronted with the following paradox: 
Let A1 and A2 be any two disjoint events having probabilities p1 
and p
2
















Hence we must have (using continuity of y) 
y(A; p) = a.p for all p, 0 ~ p ~ 1, for some number a.. 
Noting that y must assign probability one to the universal set, 
y(Q;l) = 1 implies at = 1. 
Hence we have 
y(A; p) = p for all p, 0 ~ p ~ 1. 
We conclude that if p and y are both coherent, they are identical 
(see also Edwards, 1962, Theorem 3). This is a bit of an embarrassment 
for you, because you had hoped to recalibrate your probabilities on the 
basis of the function y. 
Since a calibration curve or calibration tally presents a kind of 
y function (e.g., for all the times you said ".8," only 65% occurred), 
it cannot be used to "correct" your assessments. Indeed, we know of 
no valid model for how people should change their opinions when 
assessments they believe are coherent systematically deviate from the 
observed frequencies of events. We speculate that the fault in the 
transformation-function approach lies in the idea, expressed mathematically 
by the requirement that the function y depends on p alone, that all 
events of probability p should be transformed in the same way to some 
new probability y. Instead, we believe that what people should learn 
from outcome feedback is something about the properties of the world, 
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not about the properties of p. For example, a person who assesses 
movie attendance at a particular movie house may learn that musicals are 
less popular than previously thought, Robert Redford is a big draw, 
and space adventures are growing in popularity. Such information will 
lead to calibration through selective changes in belief, with some 
probabilities increasing and some decreasing. 
Under this view, the innocent-sounding assumption of Theorems 1 
and 2, that you know the outcome of all previous events before you state 
your probability for the next event, is seen as a psychologically strong 
requirement: Not only must you have a perfect memory for past outcomes 
but also you must be able to use the outcome information to develop a 
better understanding of the world in which these events occur. Given the 
oft-documented limitations on human cognitive abilities (Kahneman, Slavic 
& Tversky, 1982), can people achieve good calibration if given outcome 
feedback? We know of no laboratory research speaking to this issue, but 
an abundance of field research on weather forecasters (e.g., Murphy, in 
press; Murphy & Winkler, 1977) indicates that the answer is yes in their 
case. The U.S. Weather Bureau instituted probabilistic assessments in 
precipitation forecasts nationwide in 1965. These forecasts are made 
under conditions that come close1 to satisfying Theorem 2. As a group, 
the forecasters are superbly well calibrated. 
In the laboratory, however, subjects will not typically have, or 
receive, the thorough knowledge of the content area that weather 
forecasters have. Moreover, in many experiments (see Lichtenstein, 
Fischhoff & Phillips, 1982) there isn't any single content area. For 
example, subjects are first asked how many eggs were produced in the 
U.S. in 1979; next they are asked how many dimples there are on a 
golf ball, and so forth across a wide variety of topics. Our 
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speculations on the importance of content learning to the achievement 
of calibration with outcome feedback leads us to predict that when the 
content is the same for each item (e.g., predicting the winning horse 
from a large number of horse-racing past performance charts), laboratory 
subjects will quickly learn to be well calibrated, whereas they will 
find greater difficulty in achieving calibration with items of diverse 
content. 
We further speculate on the more applied problem of how to design 
training programs for assessors who will be receiving outcome feedback 
in the course of their work. Initial training in the meaning of 
probabilities will be necessary, to ensure an understanding of coherence. 
The assessor should understand, for example, that the assessment of a 
probability of 1.0 indicates not only a willingness, but even an eagerness, 
to accept a bet which pays, say, $1 if the event in question occurs, and 
which has a loss of all one's present and future worth if the event does 
not occur. 
Thereafter, however, we would not recommend a training emphasis on 
calibration, per se. A reliance on calibration tallies or calibration 
curves may encourage the trainee to search, futilely, for a transformation 
function, y. Furthermore, such summaries discard the very information 
that, we believe, is essential for satisfying the conditions of Theorems 
1 and 2: which events occurred, and which didn't? Thus we would 
recommend that training in probability assessment be fully integrated 
with training in the content material. Medical schools, for example, 
should teach about uncertainty in diagnosis while teaching about diagnosis. 
No Outcome Feedback 
We turn now to a consideration of calibration without feedback, 
and begin by exploring whether exchangeability is sufficient to ensure 
calibration. 
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Exchangeability. A set of events is exchangeable to you if each 
event has the same probability, each pair of events has the same 
probability of occurrence as each other pair, each triple the same, etc. 
Thus exchangeability is similar to independence of events with the 
same probability, but more general, since independence requires, for 
example, that the probability of two events both occurring be the 
product of their single event probabilites, while exchangeability does 
not specify what the joint probability is, as long as it is the same 
for all possible pairs. 
Exchangeability is an entirely subjective notion. You must examine 
your beliefs about joint occurrence to determine whether the events in 
a set are exchangeable. It is thus presumptuous for us to tell you when 
events are or are not exchangeable for you. 
As an example of exchangeable but not independent events, suppose 
that E. is the event that it snows on block i of Minneapolis tonight. 
1 
Suppose that you judge each block to have the same probability of being 
snowed on tonight, because it either will snow everywhere, which you 
consider it will with probability s, or it will snow nowhere, which for 
you has probability 1 - s. Under these assumptions, the events E. are 
1 
exchangeable but not independent to you; you believe that the probability 
of snow in each pair of blocks is s, each triple of blocks is s, and so 
forth. But you are sure that you will not be well calibrated on these 
events, because you are sure that either all of them will occur or none 
of them will occur. 
The following two theorems formalize our conclusion from the 
Minneapolis snow example: exchangeability does not ensure calibration. 
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deFinetti's Theorem. A fundamental theorem of deFinetti (see 
Feller, 1971, p. 228) gives the following structure for a set of exchangeable 
events: Let A
1
, •.. be an infinite exchangeable set. Then the 
probability of exactly k out of n events occurring is given by 
(1) 
for all k and n and some density f. Thus a Bayesian with an exchangeable 
opinion on a set views the events as if a p were drawn from a distribution 
with density f(p), and then, conditional on p, the events are Bernoulli 
with probabilty p. Theorem 3 follows from equation (1). 




, .•• are exchangeable, the proportion k/n 
of events that occur converges to a random variable with density f(p). 
Every event in an exchangeable set has,~ ante, the same 
probability to you, namely, the mean of the distribution with density 
f(p), as can be seen by substituting k = n = 1 in (1). So before 
receiving outcome feedback, you will report that mean, Jlpf(p)dp, as 
0 
your probability for each event. You expect the proportion of events 
that occur to converge top, but you are not sure what the value of pis. 
Your beliefs about the value of pare expressed as f(p). If f(p) is 
heaped up at its mean, you will have some modest hope that k/n will 
converge to a value close to its mean, so that you will be close to 
being well calibrated, but you would not be astonished if k/n were to 
converge on any other value of p for which f(p) has non-zero probability. 
In the Minneapolis snow example, f(p) has spikes at p = 0 and p = 1 
(" .•. it will either snow everywhere ... or it will snow nowhere") and is 
zero elsewhere, so here you are sure you will not be well calibrated. 
In general, Theorem 3 says that with exchangeable events, you will not 
automatically expect to be well calibrated. 
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Two further examples may help to illustrate Theorem 3. First, 
we ask you to assess the probability that a ball drawn from an urn will 
be red, for each of many such draws (with replacement). The urn 
contains either three red balls and one white ball or three white 
balls and one red ball, but you don't know which; you put probability 
1/2 on each of these two possibilities. Thus you assess, for each draw, 
the probability of a red ball as .5. All draws are exchangeable for 
you, but you do not expect that 50% of the draws will be red balls. 
Instead, you expect that either 25% or 75% of them will be red. Your 
f(p) is spiked at the values .25 and .75, and you would be extraordinarily 
surprised, indeed, quite suspicious of our honesty, should we report to 
you that you were well calibrated on a long series of draws. 
Consider now a national election. Suppose that you are assessing 
the probability of winning for a set of liberal candidates across 
the nation, each of whom, you believe, has probability .6 of winning. 
Further assume that these races are exchangeable to you. But suppose 
that at the same time you are aware of a nation-wide effort by ultra-
conservatives to encourage all other conservatives to vote in unprecedented 
number. If such an effort succeeds, you expect fewer than 60% of the 
liberals to win; if the effort fails or backfires, you expect more than 
60% to win. Your beliefs about the probability of success by the ultra-
conservatives are expressed in f(p), which has a mean of .6. For most 
reasonably smooth, widely spread f(p) functions, no particular set of 
outcomes will surprise you much more than any other. Still, these 
considerations, and the realization that you likely will not be well 
calibrated, do not lead you to change your assessment of .6 for each race 
in the set. 
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The following theorem adds a further constraint on your beliefs, 
in order to characterize sets of exchangeable events for which 
calibration is a consequence of coherence, under conditions of no outcome 
feedback. 




, ... , Ai, ..• be a set of events 
exchangeable to you, let S be the number of them that occur among the 
n 
first n, and let p be the probability that any given A. occurs. Then 
1 





if and only if the set is a set of independent events to you. 
Theorem 4 follows immediately from Theorem 3. 
Thus, with no outcome feedback, if events are both exchangeable 
to you and independent to you, you will expect to be well calibrated. 
Other possible conditions. Theorems 3 and 4 do not speak to the 
question of calibration in the absence of both outcome feedback and 
exchangeability. A more extensive mathematical treatment of calibration 
in the absence of outcome feedback may be found, though expressed in a 
different vocabulary, in ergodic theory (Breiman, 1968), interpreted 
subjectively. 
Ergotic theory arose in the physics of systems composed of large 
numbers of identical particles (Reif, 1965, p. 583ff). Interest 
centers on conditions under which the average over time of some system 
parameter under a fixed system state is equal to the average at a fixed 
time across all possible system states. The parallel with calibration 
is as follows: Suppose the system parameter under study is a 0-1 
variable. Then its average over time is a relative frequency. The 
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average at a fixed time across all system states may be interpreted as 
the subjective probability of the system parameter's occurrence at that 
time. The question can thus be rephrased: Under what conditions does 
the relative frequency approach the subjective probability? For large 
classes of stochastic processes, these relative frequencies converge 
to a particular random variable, as in Theorem 3, and under very special 
circumstances they converge to a constant, here interpreted as subjective 
probability, as in Theorem 4. However, none of these classes has the 
subjective intuitive appeal of exchangeability, so we will not report 
those further results here. Instead, we simply note that there do exist 
other conditions under which one would expect to be well calibrated, 
but we doubt that these conditions would ever be met either in laboratory 
or in real-life settings of subjective probability assessment. 
Violations of independence. Independence, like exchangeability, 
is an entirely subjective notion, speaking to the beliefs you hold about 
events. Two ways of testing independence are to ask yourself either 
"Will knowing the outcome of event B change my belief about A?", that 
is, P(A!'B) = P(A) is required for independence, or "Is the probability 
of the joint occurrence of A and B the same as the product of the single 
probabilities?", that is,P(A~B) = P(A) • P(B) is required for independence. 
Since independence is an essential condition for you to expect to be 
well calibrated with exchangeable events in the absence of outcome feedback, 
we here briefly discuss ways in which independence might be violated. 
The examples of exchangeability given above (snow in Minneapolis, red and 
white balls drawn from an urn, and the elections predictions) are all examples of 
non-independence; in each case the non-independence is driven by a causal 
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link between the events. Similarly, a physician's beliefs about the 
likelihood of a highly contagious flu bug present in the community will 
generate non-independence in the physician's diagnostic assessments of 
otherwise unrelated patients. 
Non-independence might also result from events whose definitions 
have some logical relation. For example, suppose I ask you to assess 
the probability that the population of one city exceeds the population 
of another, for a large set of pairs of cities (Lichtenstein & 
Fischhoff, Note 7.). Suppose that several of these city-pairs have one 
city in common. For example, you assess p
1 
that Seattle is more populous 
than Phoenix and p2 that Seattle is more populous than Wichita, etc. 
If you realize that you might be quite wrong on the population of Seattle, 
then you will recognize that you will tend to systematic error in your 





not be equal to your probability that Seattle is more populous than 
both Phoenix and Wichita. 
In general, beliefs about the possible interconnectedness of your 
beliefs as well as beliefs about the interconnectedness of events will 
lead to nonindependence. 
Implications for experimental research. Virtually all the published 
research on calibration (except the literature on weather forecasters) 
has been conducted without outcome feedback. When feedback has been 
given, it usually has involved information about calibration (i.e., 
calibration tallies or curves) without providing the subjects with 
answers to the items assessed (Adams, & Adams, 1958; Lichtenstein, & 
Fischhoff, 1980; Oskamp, 1962). Thus the experimenters should have 
expected to observe good calibration and discussed the psychological 
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import of contrary findings only if the items used in the research were 
viewed by the subjects as independent. No one has ever asked research 
subjects about independence, but we suspect that strict independence 
among items has been rare. 
The use of general-knowledge or "trivia" items has been popular in 
calibration research. Here, independence may be violated because of 
overlapping content of items. When collecting the large number of 
items needed for such research, it is difficult to avoid such overlap 
entirely. One subject of Lichtenstein and Fischhoff's (1980) took 
great glee in pointing out to the experimenters such problems (for example, 
the same alternative was used as one of two possible answers to two 
different questions; it could not have been the correct alternative for 
both). 
Some research had used items all of which refer to the same content 
(e.g., 100 handwriting samples, for each of which the task was to 
assess the probability that it was written by a European rather than 
an American; Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977). Research on assessments 
of uncertain quantities has sometimes used group-generated proportions 
for their items (e.g., Alpert & Raiffa, 1982 ; Moskowitz & Bullers, 
Note 8; Selvidge, Note 9). In these tasks, the subjects were first asked 
facts <;1bout themselves, like "Do you prefer bourbon to scotch?"; then 
they assessed the proportion of subjects answering yes to those questions. 
Suppose in these situations that the assessor uses some strategy or theory 
to aid in making all the assessments. For example, subjects assessing 
group-generated proportions may believe that "Most people have preferences 
like mine." For the handwriting task, an assessor may believe that cramped 
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writing is more likely to be European than American. If the assessor 
has uncertainty about the validity of the theory, that uncertainty would 
lead to lack of subjective independence among the events. 
A relatively new area of research in calibration deals with the 
assessment of future events (most of this research has not yet been 
published, but see Fischhoff and Beyth, 1975). In developing a large 
number of items all of which will be decided within a relatively short 
period of time (so that the experimenters can score the items), it is 
difficult to avoid items with relationships among them (e.g., will 
Democrat X win the upstate election? Will Democrat Y win downstate?). 
For these reasons, we suspect that the items used in past research 
would not have all been judged strictly independent by all subjects. 
Thus, one could say that the finding that subjects are often badly 
calibrated (usually, overconfident) has little meaning, since Theorem 4 
says that one wouldn't expect good calibration. However, we reject this 
reasoning. We believe that the non-independence in most past studies 
was so small as to have virtually no impact on the results. With large 
numbers of items, most subjects do not remember previous items when 
responding to the current one. Moreover, subjects who use simplifying 
theories to aid them in the task ("cramped writing is more likely to be 
European") probably do not question or doubt their own theories, and it 
is the doubt about such a theory, not the theory itself, which induces 
non-independence. Finally, with items of diverse content, one could 
reasonably expect that the effects of the few interdependencies would 
tend to cancel each other out (some leading to too many items being 
correct, others to too few) in the overall calibration. Therefore, 
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we find ourselves still believing the results of past research purporting 
to show that people are generally overconfident in the extent and 
accuracy of their own knowledge. Still, research that specifically 
addresses problems of subjective non-independence is needed. 
Let us suppose for a moment that previous laboratory findings will 
replicate when subjective independence of items is carefully satisfied; 
specifically, suppose that people tend to be badly calibrated with trivia 
items, but that this overconfidence can be eliminated to some degree by 
showing the assessors their own calibration curves (without outcome 
feedback; Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1980) or by making the assessors 
focus on reasons why they might be wrong (Koriat, Lichtenstein & 
Fischhoff, 1980). How should we view such results in the light of 
Theorem 4? The subjects in psychological experiments are typically 
not Bayesians, indeed, are not informed at all about probability theory. 
The instructions they receive do not educate them about the fine 
points of coherence. Thus we would not be surprised if subjects' 
responses aren't coherent probabilities and are quite easy to change. 
Despite some promising beginnings (Pitz, 1974; Ferrell & McGoey, 
1980), we still do not have an adequate theory about how people form 
and express feelings of uncertainty. Even when the exchangeability and 
independence assumptions are not met, research on calibration can serve 
to advance our understanding of these processes. For example, experimental 
manipulations that change calibration (e.g., Koriat, Lichtenstein, & 
Fischhoff, 1980; Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977) can suggest what 
processes are involved in the formation of uncertainty. In these 
endeavors to build cognitive psychology, however, we should take care not 
to claim that good calibration is a goal to which reasonable people 
should always strive. 
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On becoming rich. Calibration tasks do not provide evidence about 
the assessor's coherence (such evidence would be sought in the assessments 
of not only P(A) and P(B), but also P(AjB), P(BjA), P(AOB), and so forth). 
Thus we cannot use calibration tasks to become rich by developing Dutch 
books on other assessors. However, if people are generally overconfident 
in assessing probabilities, seemingly attractive bets having negative 
expected value to the assessor can easily be written. In a wide 
/ 
variety of tasks involving the assessments of fractiles for uncertain 
quantities, for example, naive assessors are, overall, so overconfident 
that some 40% of all true answers lie outside their central 99% confidence 
intervals (Lichtenstein et al., 1982 ). Such assessors should be 
willing to accept bets that seem quite favorable to them yet provide 
the offerer excellent odds of winning. Subjects' willingness in such 
situations has been reported by Pitz (1974), whose subjects showed a 
systematic preference for betting on the central regions rather than 
on the tails of their own assessed distributions, and by Fischhoff, 
Slovic, and Lichtenstein (1977), some of whose subjects expressed 
eagerness to enter what was in fact a losing "trivia-hustling" game. 
Implications for practice. Some authors (e.g., Brown, Kahr & 
Peterson, 1974, pp. 437-438) have recommended that probability assessors 
study their own calibration on trivia items and apply the lessons so 
learned to their real-world assessments. We recommend against such a 
training procedure. First, a justification of this procedure would 
require strong and quite dubious assumptions about exchangeability and 
independence between the set of trivia questions and the set of real-
world events to be considered later. Secondly, there is no evidence that 
the lessons learned from such exercises ("I'm overconfident with trivia 
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items") would be appropriately generalized when people make assessments 
in their area of expertise. Finally, with sufficient effort by the 
designers, trivia items can be written that strike everyone as independent 
(What's the relationship between golf ball dimples and egg production?). 
This may lull assessors into carelessly assuming, without critical 
examination, that the real-world events they are assessing are also 
independent. 
A reasonably stable measurement of calibration requires a large 
amount of data. It may be rare to find situations outside the laboratory 
in which an assessor makes a large number (e.g., 500) of assessments 
before receiving any outcome feedback. More typically, an assessor 
may make only a few assessments, five or twenty, before receiving 
outcome feedback. If so, the situation is more like that of Theorems 1 
and 2; concern for independence is lessened, and the focus of the assessor's 
attention in evaluating the feedback is to learn which events occurred 
and why. 
When a large number of assessments are made in practical settings 
before outcome feedback is received, the question of independence is 
crucial in evaluating calibration. Sometimes non-independence will be 
obvious, as when a set of assessments about future economic events all 
depend on, say, the growth of the national economy. Then the message 
from Theorems 3 and 4 is that assessors should just not care about their 
calibration. Indeed, it may be misleading even to look at a calibration 
tally. 
Still, there may be occasions when it is appropriate to study 
calibration in practical settings. What can be learned from such 
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exercises? Suppose that you assess probabilities (without outcome 
feedback at the time) for a set of events that you believe are 
exchangeable and independent. Suppose the data (when later you get 
outcome feedback) suggest that you are quite badly calibrated. How 
should you regard these data? You might attribute the source of your 
trouble to one or more of the following causes: 
1. It might be that you are indeed well calibrated in the long 
run, but the finite sample of data is a rare one. This possibility 
becomes less likely as the sample size increases, but can never be 
entirely ruled out. 
2. Despite your best efforts, your probability assessments may 
be incoherent. Calibration tallies or curves do not, in themselves, 
provide evidence of incoherence. It may be, however, that if you 
assessed probabilities of joint events (unions, intersections, etc.), 
you would discover a way to write a Dutch book against yourself. The 
existence of such a Dutch book would show that your assessments were 
incoherent. 
3. Your expressed probabilities and assumptions may not have 
truly represented your beliefs. For example, you may have been too 
quick to assume independence among the events, without critical 
examination. You should especially be alert to the existence of 
previously unnoticed conditioning events (e.g., assuming that the U.S. 
would not enter a severe depression when forecasting future energy 
needs) that linked all your assessments. 
4. It may be that your beliefs about the world are wrong. You 
may have, at the time, unquestioningly believed that the incidence of 
cramped handwriting is more likely among Europeans than Americans, 
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but when outcome feedback becomes available, you learn that your belief 
was false. The theorems presented above are subjectivist; they describe 
the conditions under which you believe you are well calibrated. But 
they do not guarantee that you will, in fact, be well calibrated. 
The theorems presented above will not help you to choose among 
these four possibilities. Only further exploration and consideration 
of the events in question may inform you of the source of your difficulty. 
Calibration, we conclude, is dependent more on the characteristics of 
and interrelationships among the events than on your feelings of 
uncertainty concerning each event considered in isolation. 
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1. These forecasters usually make three forecasts at a time, for 
example, one for the forthcoming six hours and two more for the two 
12-hour periods thereafter. They thus do not know the outcomes of the 
first two of these when assessing the third. 
Proof of Theorem 1. (Pratt) 
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Appendix 
Let X. = 1 if a. falls below the p-point of its assessed 
l. l. 
distribution, Xi= 0 otherwise. Then 
P(Xl = 1) = p 
P(X
2 
= lla1 ) = P 
and in general 
for all k and all a
1
, •.• , ak. 
Since x1 is a function of a1 , it follows from (2) and the properties 
of conditional expectation that 





Since x1 , ••• , ~-l are functions of a1 , ..• , ak-l' it follows similarly 
that 
P(~+l = 1IX1 , ... , ~) = P for all k and for all x1 , . • • , ~· (5) 
From (1), (4), and (5) it follows that x1, x2 , ... is (marginally, i.e., n 
initially) a Bernoulli process with parameter p and hence S = r x_ 
n k=l -K 
is Binomial. This proves part (a). Part (b) follows immediately. 
